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Abstract
By introducing the user-pays principle into the irrigation water pricing debate, the 1998 National Water Act created a demand for
models to measure willingness-to-pay for irrigation water. Water values are traditionally simulated with mathematical program-
ming models. Models differ in their treatment of crops, irrigation options and water constraints, and other firm-level characteristics
but they all use shadow prices as an indication of water value. The 17 models reviewed here, report average annual water values
of between $0.0042·m-3 and $0.1899·m-3. Crops modelled influence water values, but there is no apparent relationship between
objective function specification and average value. Nor does the number of irrigation options seem to influence water value either.
The policy implication is that while similar models for the same region produce consistent estimates, each region requires its own
model that has to be updated regularly.
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Introduction
By raising the issue of full cost-recovery, the 1998 National Water
Act made it clear that up to that point irrigation water was
considerably subsidised in South Africa, and that price increases
would be necessary to achieve optimal allocation. The Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) responded immediately by
doubling water rates in many cases, but it is unclear whether full
cost-recovery would be feasible in the short term. While clear
consensus exists about the conditions for allocative efficiency, as
outlined by Sampath (1992), the international debate on the feasi-
bility of full cost-recovery is far from over. The conclusion of this
debate is an empirical issue; when the net present value of the total
benefit of irrigation water is smaller than the net present value of
total costs, full cost-recovery is impossible. When it is greater, full
cost-recovery is feasible. One thus needs an accurate estimate of the
demand for irrigation water to resolve the empirical issue. This
creates a demand for models to measure willingness-to-pay for
irrigation water. While isolated alternatives exist, mathematical
programming is traditionally the tool of choice to simulate irriga-
tion water values (Gibbons, 1986). This review discusses the
theoretical framework on which this class of model relies and then
describes 17 models reported over the past 20 years before conclud-
ing on the potential usefulness of mathematical programming
models to resolve the empirical cost-recovery debate.
Theoretical framework
Ricardian rents provide the theoretical framework for residual
imputation with mathematical programming models. Under per-
fect competition, when the firm is a price-taker in factor and
product markets, payments to all variable factors of production are
exactly equal to total revenue, making economic profits zero. Here
the firm is a farm. The theory is simple. Economic profits, if any
exist, are returns to fixed factors of production, potentially includ-
ing irrigation water.
By this logic static and dynamic linear and non-linear program-
ming models have been used not only to simulate total benefits of
irrigation water, but also to derive demand functions for it. Models
are set up to maximise profit subject to, amongst others, water
constraints, which are then parametrically tightened to derive a
schedule of shadow prices. A linear programming shadow price is
the marginal contribution to the objective function (profit) attrib-
utable to an additional unit of the binding constraint (Beneke and
Winterboer, 1973). The shadow price of water directly estimates
the marginal value product of water; the demand for the resource
is simply the quantity constraint as a function of the shadow price
and total value is the integral of this function. To be an accurate
estimate of water value, water must be the only fixed factor in the
model and the input-output coefficients must be correct.
The vast majority of irrigation water value models use residual
imputation. Even Howe (1985), who based his demand curve for
water on the gross margin of individual crops, uses the idea that
residual profits indicate the value of water. There are three alterna-
tives to residual imputation. The first estimates a crop-water
production function from field trials and then scales this physical
production function by the price of the product (Colby, 1989;
Penzhorn and Marais, 1998). The second approach is to estimate a
demand function directly from water price data. Griffin and Perry
(1985) presented an econometric model using panel data of irriga-
tion prices in Texas. The third approach is to use Hedonic pricing
methods to measure the contribution of water value to farm prices.
Torell et al. (1990) estimated water in the Ogallala Aquifer to be
worth between $0.0009·m-3·a-1 and $0.0077·m-3·a-1. Faux and Perry
(1999) estimated the water value in Malheur County, Oregon, to be
between $0.0073·m-3·a-1 and $0.0357·m-3·a-1.
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Discussion of mathematical programming
models
Since the accuracy of water value estimates depends on how
realistic a model is, models relying on extensive surveys should
produce better results than models using smaller or more general
datasets. Incorporating a large percentage of observed crops, soil
variances, accurate supply constraints and a comprehensive range
of irrigation substitution possibilities should also improve esti-
mates. Not all models achieve everything. The literature separates
them into three main strands; optimal allocation models, water
demand models that estimate the value of water under various
scenarios, and other models that incorporate aspects that may be
included in future water value models.
Optimal allocation models
Timing of irrigation events matters almost as much as the size of the
application. Some mathematical programming models calculate
benefits foregone from not scheduling optimally during the course
of an irrigation season. Flinn and Musgrave (1967) specified yield
as a function of cumulative irrigation. McGuckin et al. (1987)
optimised irrigation scheduling using a random timeframe based
on heat units instead of chronological time. The dynamic program-
ming model accounts for stochastic weather and soil water pro-
cesses and expresses water stress as a proportion of “full irrigation”
yield. Activities consist of combinations of three crops (maize,
sorghum and cotton) and two irrigation systems (furrow and
sprinkler). Optimal scheduling raised profits by 5%. Average water
values are presented in Table 1.
In another dynamic programming model, Bryant et al. (1993)
chose to irrigate or not irrigate maize and sorghum with a centre-
pivot system in 16 different growth stages. A fixed volume of water
is applied during each irrigation event. The model also includes
dryland production and the option to abandon crops during
droughts. The EPIC crop simulator calculates maize and sorghum
yields for each irrigation strategy. The economic model subtracts a
variable irrigation cost and harvesting and handling costs from
actual commodity revenues to find net revenue. The cost of
working capital is included at 12% per year. The model was
calibrated with data provided by the Texas Extension Service.
Results indicate that it is optimal to irrigate the driest field any time
unless maize is below wilting point, in which case maize gets
priority over sorghum. Irrigation scheduling leads to a marginal
($1.25 to $3.50·ac-1) improvement in profit. Average water values
are not reported.
Where farms have access to more than one source of water, for
example fresh surface water and saline groundwater, the schedul-
ing decision involves selecting water from the cheapest source,
adjusted for the salt sensitivity by growth stage. Three examples of
this approach are given in Cornforth and Lacewell (1982), Lefkoff
and Gorelick (1990) and Afzal et al. (1992). All three models
TABLE 1
Simulated irrigation water values
Model Study site Crops Irrigation Objective function Water value*
options $/1000m3
Howe, 1985 Colorado River 8 - Gross margin -70.53 – 47.83
Gardner & Young, 1988 Colorado River 5 10 Returns to land & water 40.54
Booker, 1990 Colorado River 4 9 Gross margin 13.58
Michelsen & Young, 1993 Colorado 4 3 Net revenue 68.91
Booker & Young, 1994 Colorado River 22 9 Gross margin 14.95
Taylor & Young, 1995 Colorado 3 3 Gross margin 7.30 – 21.89
Cornforth & Lacewell, 1982 El Paso, Texas 12 2 Net revenue 6.7 – 7.94
McGuckin et al., 1987 New Mexico 3 2 Gross income 8.51 – 15.10
Lefkoff and Gorelick, 1990 Arkansas Valley 2 2 Gross margin 6.55 – 39.91
Torell et al., 1990 Ogallala aquifer Hedonic pricing 9.00 – 7.70
Dinar et al., 1993 Central California 3 2 Net revenue (NPV) 99.34
Bryant et al., 1993 Texas High Plains 2 101 Gross margin Not reported
Teague et al., 1995 Oklahoma Panhandle 3 2 Gross margin 170.69
Turner & Perry, 1997 Deschutes River, Oregon 7 16 Returns to water 20.27 – 113.50
Faux and Perry, 1999 Malheur County, Oregon Hedonic pricing 7.30 – 35.70
Afzal et al., 1992** Punjab, Pakistan 4 2 Gross margin 189.95
Grove & Oosthuizen, 1997 Winterton, SA 1 1 Gross margin 39.44
Louw & Van Scalkwyk, 1997 Olifants River, SA 13 1 Returns to water & risk 44.80
Louw & Van Scalkwyk, 2000 Berg River, SA Net farm income 0 – 7.55
Grove & Oosthuizen, 2001 Little Tugela, SA 1 1 Gross margin Not reported
Conradie, 2002 Fish-Sundays scheme, SA 6 5 Returns to water 4.23
* Nominal values in $1000·m-3·a-1.   ** Marginal value.
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optimise with static linear programming. Cornforth and Lacewell
(1982) found that scheduling only improves total water value by
3%, while Lefkoff and Gorelick (1990) recorded a 38% improve-
ment and Afzal et al. (1992) noted a 65% gain by omitting four out
of the last five irrigation events for cotton.
In the Cornforth and Lacewell’s (1982) model successive
periods took a block diagonal design. Net revenue is maximised
over several years across ten annual crops as well as pecan trees and
lucerne for six soils and two water sources. Afzal et al. (1992)
maximised net revenue across four crops (maize, wheat, barley and
cotton), one irrigation technology and two water sources. The
model incorporates a standard Doornbosh-Kassam salinity dam-
age function and models deficit irrigation as missing an irrigation
event. Lefkoff and Gorelick (1990) used an existing hydrological
model of their study area to track water percolation and salt loading.
The objective function maximises firm-level profits across two
crops (maize and lucerne) and two water sources subject to an area
constraint, a surface water constraint and a pumping constraint.
The cost for using unlimited groundwater is the salinity damage
incurred.
Grove and Oosthuizen (1997) investigated the effects of deficit
irrigation and improving irrigation systems efficiency. ACRU was
used to model the hydrology, the indicator crop was wheat and the
system technology is not reported. The objective function maxim-
ises net income in a chance-constrained linear programming model.
Water stress is modelled as yield reduction of the Doornbos-
Kassam type. A maximum water reduction of 20% was allowed.
Supply conditions are varied parametrically and return flows are
calculated ex-post, by assuming that roughly half of non-consump-
tive use can be used downstream similar to Booker’s (1990)
specification. This paper reports a base value of returns to water and
other fixed factors of $0.0394·m-3·a-1. Improving systems efficiency
from 67% to 75% increases gross margin by $0.0006·m-3·a-1.
This is interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay to improve
systems efficiency.
Water demand models
This strand of the literature includes models used to derive water
demand functions. Two examples from the local literature are
notable insofar as they accurately represent observed crops. Louw
and Van Schalkwyk (1997) estimated water demand for the Olifants
River in the Western Cape that accounts for 95% of the irrigated
area in the basin. Conradie (2002) modelled 50 000ha of fodder
crops and citrus orchards on the Fish-Sundays transfer scheme in
the Eastern Cape. Conradie (2002) explicitly modelled links with
extensive sheep and goat farming in areas adjacent to the river.
Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997) reported an average water value
of $0.0448·m-3·a-1 while Conradie (2002) found an average value of
$0.0042·m-3·a-1 overall and $0.0249·m-3·a-1 for citrus farms.
Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997) maximised the present value
of returns to risk and water while Conradie (2002) only used a
single period static model but explicitly modelled returns to risk
with a MOTAD specification. Both models account for overhead
costs (at different rates for irrigated and dry-land production)
including household living expenses, water rates and interest.
Thirteen crops (citrus, wine grapes, table grapes, lucerne, potatoes,
tomatoes, onions, watermelon, squash, green beans, sweet pota-
toes, sweet corn and pumpkin) were modelled for the existing
irrigation technology in Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997).
COMBUD data were used. The ratio of bearing to non-bearing
orchards is specified exogenously to ensure orchard replacement.
Conradie (2002) used the same approach for citrus and lucerne, but
modelled various typical farms by varying the ratio of bearing to
non-bearing orchards. Conradie (2002) modelled six crops (lu-
cerne, maize, dry beans, potatoes, pasture and citrus), four live-
stock activities (wool sheep, angoras, dairy cows and ostriches) and
five irrigation systems (flood, laser-levelled flood, sprinkler, centre
pivot, micro jets) on 16 typical farms. The 16 typical farms were
identified from a 25% sample of all irrigators on the scheme and
crop and livestock data were collected in interviews with farmers
and extension specialists. Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997) used
an exogenous crop constraint to calibrate their model.
Gardner and Young (1988) designed one of a series of linear
programming models to test policy options for the Colorado River.
The model compares the efficiency and cost effectiveness of
irrigation equipment subsidies to effluent taxes and price increases
for irrigation water. The model maximises net revenue across five
crops (lucerne, barley, maize, pasture and dry beans) and four
irrigation technologies (siphon tubes, gated pipes, ported ditch and
‘cablegation’) used at different labour intensities with and without
lined ditches. Land retirement is also an option. Crop mix is
exogenously constrained to the long-term average plus and minus
one standard deviation. Parameters for crop activities come from
extension service reports while irrigation extension specialists
supplied irrigation parameters. The average baseline value of
irrigation water is $0.0405·m-3·a-1. The most cost-effective way to
reduce saline return-flows is by subsidising irrigation hardware.
Salt loads can be reduced by about 10% by a fourfold price increase
($4.49·t-1 salt removed), by taxing salt directly ($1.10·t-1 salt
removed) or by subsidising irrigation hardware ($0.40·t-1 salt
removed).
Booker (1990) updated Gardner and Young (1988) to form the
irrigation component of a basin-wide allocation model of the
Colorado River. Booker (1990) maximised net revenue across four
crops (lucerne, maize, pasture and dry beans) for nine irrigation
strategies. It is assumed that lucerne fields are replanted every sixth
year and crop mix is specified in an exogenous constraint. Peren-
nial fruit is mentioned but not modelled. Booker (1990) argued that
since fruit generate higher returns to water than field crops, model
results represent a lower bound of agricultural values. A simple
salinity constraint, in the form of a salt balance derived from return-
flows, allowed Booker (1990) to trade off upstream irrigation
benefits against downstream salinity damages. Return-flows are
the difference between water applied and average consumptive use
for the area. Booker (1990) estimated that the average value of the
current allocation is $0.0136·m-3·a-1. A 20% reduction of the allo-
cation increases the marginal water value to $0.0523·m-3·a-1. The
marginal cost of salinity is also reported.
The Michelsen and Young (1993) model maximises net rev-
enue and accounts for four crops (maize, lucerne, dry beans and
barley) and two irrigation systems (furrow and flood). The model
also incorporates dry-land lucerne. The typical exogenous range on
crop mix is used in this case and the model incorporates a stochastic
river flow component to simulate droughts. Results show an offer
price of  $0.0689·m-3·a-1, clearly suggesting gains from trade with
Denver where additional supplies are estimated to cost $3.24·m-3·a-1.
In a similar paper Louw and Van Schalkwyk (2000) analysed
the effect of potential water markets in the Berg River basin of the
Western Cape, South Africa. The model maximises social welfare
(consumer and producer surplus) across six production districts as
well as residential and industrial use. It includes perennial and
annual crops, but does not say which. The irrigation options are
also not reported. In the base case current irrigation water values
vary between zero and $0.00045·m-3·a-1 with a median value of
zero. When irrigators are permitted to sell water at $0.006·m-3·a-1,
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the median residual value increases to $0.00137·m-3·a-1. A 20%
reduction in available water (or a 20% increase in urban
demand) leaves irrigation water values unaffected at sale prices of
$0.003·m-3·a-1.
Booker and Young (1994) presented a basin-wide analysis for
the Colorado River that maximises net economic surplus across all
uses. The model includes mass balance constraints of water and
soluble salts, using Booker’s (1990) return-flow specification.
Municipal demand and inter-basin transfers are assumed fixed, and
hydropower benefits are modelled as marginal costs avoided.
Irrigation benefit functions, estimated from programming results,
calculate profits as a function of the water constraint. Irrigation
demand in the lower basin represents 13 crops on two soil types for
high (1 100 mg·l-1) and low (800 mg·l-1) salinity. Four crops and
nine irrigation strategies are modelled in the upper basin. The
results for six institutional scenarios involving various marketing
arrangements are presented. Municipal demand in California val-
ues water at $0.2432·m-3·a-1 while irrigation generates values of
$0.0146·m-3·a-1. This demand can be met from Californian irriga-
tion (intra-state trade) or Colorado irrigation (inter-state trade).
Redistribution within California and across states increases total
benefit as expected. The total loss to agriculture is much lower in
the second case, because removing a structural transfer constraint
allows low value irrigation upstream to be accessed first.
Turner and Perry (1997) examined willingness to sell irrigation
water with a linear programming model that accounts for uncertain
water supplies by defining the objective function as a function of
probable crop yield. Yield, in turn, is a quadratic function of
available water. The model incorporates seven crops (irrigated
pasture and grass hay, lucerne, wheat, peppermint oil, carrot seed,
garlic seed and bluegrass seed) and sixteen irrigation options
ranging from basic flood technology to centre pivots. Each technol-
ogy is modelled with and without irrigation scheduling which is
assumed to improve systems efficiency by 10% and reduce deep
percolation by 5%. The model isolates water values as the residual
profit after all other fixed factors have been compensated at
opportunity cost. Risk is treated as a firm-level fixed cost, and
rental values in the area were used as a proxy for land rents. Here,
fixed costs are not subtracted as a flat rate per hectare but expressed
as a fraction of gross income, allowing profit increases or decreases
to be spread equally across all fixed factors and not accrue to water
only as in the case of the Louw and Van Schalkwyk (1997) or
Conradie (2002) models. The average value of water derived from
fodder crop production is estimated to be $0.0203·m-3·a-1. About a
third of current allocation is used to irrigate fodder crops. The
highest value crop is vegetable seed, which generates a water value
of $0.1135·m-3·a-1.
Taylor and Young (1995) introduced stochastic weather into
the standard valuation model, showing that uncertainty about
weather increases water values in a dry year and decreases water
values in a wet year compared to average evaporation figures. In the
standard model the marginal value of water at the mean diversion
level is estimated to be $0.0219·m-3·a-1 in dry years and $0.0073·m-
3·a-1 in wet years. Uncertainty about weather reduces the marginal
value of water in a wet year to zero, and increases the value of water
in a dry year to $0.0389·m-3·a-1. Taylor and Young (1995) modelled
the planting decision in the presence of an uncertain water supply.
Crop decisions, the control variables, are revised at various produc-
tion stages. The model maximises expected regional income across
three crops (maize, lucerne and sorghum), four soil types, three
irrigation strategies and two water supply scenarios. As in the case
of Afzal et al. (1992) deficit irrigation is defined as omitting an
irrigation event, rather than applying smaller volumes. Crop rota-
tion is an exogenous constraint. The model is calibrated to observed
crop distribution.
Related models
A small number of alternative specifications need to be noted. The
model developed by Mallawaarachchi et al. (1992) is interesting
for two reasons. First, it contributes to the tiny literature on the
decision to invest in water saving irrigation technologies for
perennial crops. Secondly, it models the water constraint as a water
purchase activity rather than the usual resource constraint. The
model maximises terminal value of a 20-year investment period,
which is equivalent to maximising net present value (Malla-
waarachchi et al., 1992). Results show that the decision to switch
to drip irrigation is taken to avoid water cost or to expand orchards.
Dinar et al. (1993) refines the standard model by using lysimeter
field data to derive firm-level production functions instead using a
crop simulation model to derive the deficit irrigation function. The
model incorporates multiple sources and qualities of water and
permits a water marketing activity. Three crops are included
(wheat, sorghum and irrigated pasture) and two irrigation tech-
nologies are modelled. Baseline results indicate an average water
value of $0.0993·m-3·a-1. The policy options considered are water
taxes, effluent taxes and technology subsidies. Two results are
particularly interesting. First, a subsidy of 60% of capital cost is
necessary to make farmers indifferent to deciding between flood
and sprinkler technology. Secondly, while Pigovian taxes are more
effective and cost-efficient than targeting irrigation water, the
difference is negligible, suggesting that the more straightforward
procedure is the appropriate policy intervention.
Teague et al. (1997) used target MOTAD to examine various
levels of compliance with nitrate and pesticide regulation. The
standard target MOTAD formulation sets a target income and
varies a risk aversion coefficient parametrically. In this model a
compliance coefficient is varied around a target level of nitrate or
pesticide leaching. This environmental risk aversion parameter is
interpreted as “the acceptable level of compliance with the target”,
and the magnitude of the coefficient indicates how much more
pesticide or nitrate leaching than the specified target a farm
produces. The advantage of this formulation is that it allows a non-
linear leaching function. The model includes three crops (maize,
wheat, and sorghum) in various rotations on two soil types (clay
loam and sandy loam) allowing three kinds of irrigation (furrow,
centre pivot and dry-land). The model also includes a significant
dry-land component. Results indicate that the base value of water
is $0.1707·m-3·a-1.
Onal et al. (1998) modelled the water quality of runoff
from arable land. The idea to limit the variability of economic loss
across farmers, so that the cost of a given policy is equitably
distributed across participants, is a useful way to introduce
equity in water value models. An equal sharing of losses is
defined as the (perfectly) equitable solution while zero equity is
defined as the case where a single person bears all the costs and
everybody else continues as before. The model is a chance-
constrained programming model that maximises a margin above
certain variable costs subject to the normal constraints. It includes
a stochastic variable representing atrazine leaching to a nearby
reservoir.
Grove and Oosthuizen (2001) modelled supply conditions in
the Little Tugela basin as shares of available streamflow rather than
quantities of water. The model provides for three water categories,
namely diversions, return-flows and water remaining in-stream
due to selling water upstream. It integrates the ACRU hydrology
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model into a mixed integer non-linear programming model. Re-
sults indicate that unconstrained water markets will improve gross
margin by 6%, but that they will cause streamflow externalities as
identified by Huffaker and Whittlesey (1995). If water rights are
specified as consumptive use quantities, and trade is permitted, the
benefit of trade is even smaller.
Berger (2001) emphasised the spatial heterogeneity of farming,
an idea that Conradie (2002) captures by aggregating regional
demand from 16 typical farms. Berger (2001) defined firm-level
economic constraints such as farm size, soil type, water availabil-
ity, interest rates paid, transport costs and so on. The model also
assigns an adopter category to each farmer and then internalises the
technology adoption process through common pools of informa-
tion that result from the actions of innovators. Land and water
markets and irrigation water return flows further refine spatial
interactions in a regional model. The model output is a cumulative
frequency of adoption of various technological innovations that
recognise transaction costs explicitly and does not calculate water
value as such.
Discussion and conclusion
The water values in Table 1 cover a broad range that is partly due
to model specification. The difference in average water values
between regions is not surprising. For example, there is no reason
to be alarmed by the discrepancy in Conradie (2002) and Louw and
Van Schalkwyk (1997). Willingness-to-pay for irrigation water is
determined jointly by product price and the marginal productivity
of irrigation. Location as a proxy for, amongst others, climate
(which limits crop choice) captures the marginal product of irriga-
tion. The value of $0.00423·m-3·a-1 for the Eastern Cape simply
indicates a different crop mix than observed in the Western Cape
where average water value is estimated to be $0.04480·m-3·a-1.
One would even expect differences over time for the same
location since product prices may change. The upper basin of the
Colorado River is perhaps the most intensively researched irriga-
tion system in the world when it comes to simulation models of
water value. Barring the Howe (1985) model, which considers
individual crops including fodder crops that do not have a formal
market, the annual value of irrigation water per thousand cubic
meters is estimated to be between $7.30 and $68.91. The median
value of $14.95 indicates that when using similar methods for a
given location, resulting values are tightly grouped.
The implication for policy makers is that in order to calculate
willingness-to-pay for irrigation, each region needs its own simu-
lation model that has to be updated regularly. A far more serious
concern is the nature of the data used to populate the models.
Almost all models rely on gross margin activity budgets compiled
by extension services. Activity budgets are associated with typical
farms, while it is well-known that farms are seldom homogeneous
in a region. A comprehensive set of enterprise budgets is an integral
part of any current model of water value in order to derive
reasonably accurate estimates of willingness-to-pay for water.
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